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Abstract
We design a global refunding scheme as a new international approach to address
climate change. A global refunding system allows each country to set its car-
bon emission tax, while aggregate tax revenues are partially refunded to member
countries in proportion to the relative emission reductions they achieve within a
given period. In a simple model we show that a suitably designed global refunding
scheme is self-enforcing and achieves the social global optimum.
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The threat posed by climate change to the well-being of future generations appears to
be substantial (see, e.g., Goulder and Pizer forthcoming, Stern 2006, Nordhaus 2006,
Tol 2006). Mitigating climate change, however, is a global public good, as each country’s
eﬀorts to control emissions will beneﬁt all countries in a non-exclusive and non-rival
manner. Countries therefore have an incentive to free-ride on other countries’ eﬀorts to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The prisoner’s dilemma aspect of mitigating climate
change and the absence of a supranational authority makes international coordination
both crucial and exceptionally diﬃcult to achieve. Countries may either lack the incen-
tive to sign an agreement and beneﬁt from the signatories’ abatement eﬀorts or they
may have incentives not to comply with promises made in an agreement.
There is a large body of literature addressing the underprovision of international pollu-
tion control. At the practical level the Kyoto Protocol, as the ﬁrst signiﬁcant interna-
tional eﬀort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, has been criticized for being ineﬀective
(see, e.g., Böhringer and Vogt 2003, Nordhaus and Boyer 1999, Schelling 2002, McK-
ibbin and Wilcoxen 2002, Barrett 2003). As a consequence, various other approaches
to international coordination have been suggested. Aldy et al. (2003) summarize the
alternatives, which include an international carbon tax and international technology
standards. Recently, Gersbach (2007) has proposed a further alternative for an inter-
national agreement by allowing each country to determine its own emission tax while
aggregate tax revenues are partially refunded to members in proportion to the relative
emission reductions they achieve within a given period. In this paper we design such a
global refunding scheme and explore its potential for mitigating climate change.
A considerable body of research has examined the formation of international environ-
mental agreements using game-theoretic models. The main focus of this literature is
on the conditions leading to coalition formation by signing a multilateral agreement.
Such agreements must be self-enforcing since there is no supranational authority to en-
sure compliance. Two types of models have been used: two-stage games (Carraro 2000,
Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, 1998, Chander and Tulkens 1992, Finus et al. 2006, Hoel
1992) and inﬁnitely repeated games (Asheim et al. 2006, Barrett 1994, 1999, 2003).
The former approach has emphasized that either stable coalitions are small or that the
abatement level that can be sustained in larger coalitions is small. The latter approach
focuses on renegotiation proof agreements and shows that the allocation of abatement
1burdens is crucial for the formation of agreements. As in the two-stage game frame-
works, it is unlikely that a grand coalition will be formed, and if it is formed it will
achieve very little. Moreover, sub-coalitions may be better for their members than the
grand coalition, and regional agreements can Pareto-dominate a regime based on a
global treaty. A further strand of the literature employs cooperative game theory and
applies transfer schemes to treaty-making (see Carraro et al. 2006 for a discussion of
this literature and for the design of optimal transfer systems).
In general, an international agreement has to solve two problems: accession and self-
enforcement. An international agreement will solve the accession problem if all countries
voluntarily decide to join the treaty instead of free-riding. Self-enforcement means that
it is in the interests of all countries to comply with the treaty over its whole lifetime.
In this paper we concentrate on the problem of self-enforcement. Accordingly, we outline
the mechanics of a global refunding scheme (GRS) and examine its potential for an
international treaty. We consider a simple two-stage model in which each country can
freely set national abatement levels by choosing a national tax rate. Participation
implies an initial payment and that national abatement taxes are collected in a global
fund, which is partially reimbursed in each period to member countries. Each country
receives refunds in proportion to its relative emission reductions over the last period.
The fraction of the fund that is not distributed to member countries is invested and
earns proﬁts. This creates a growing incentive for member countries to abate and to
stay in the GRS.
We show that a suitably designed GRS is self-enforcing in the sense that compliance
with abatement objectives is in the interests of all countries. In fact, provided that all
countries join the GRS, it can induce countries to choose abatement levels that are
globally optimal.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce a simple two-period model
with n identical countries that can abate emissions by setting individual emission taxes.
Net emissions accumulate to an aggregate stock that imposes a negative externality on
all countries. In Section 3 we derive the socially optimal and decentralized solutions,
which are the benchmarks for the analysis of the global refunding scheme introduced
in Section 4. Here we discuss the properties of the global refunding scheme and show
that, provided that all countries join, the GRS is self-enforcing and achieves the global
optimum. In Section 5 we discuss the accession problem and some institutional and
2structural assumptions of our model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a world lasting for two periods, t = 1 and t = 2. There are n identical
countries characterized by an emission function E, a cost function C, and a damage
function D. Throughout the paper countries are indexed by i and j.
Emissions of country i in period t are assumed to be a strictly decreasing linear function
of emission taxes τi
t. No emission tax results in baseline emissions ¯ e:
E = E(τ
i
t) = ¯ e − ητ
i
t , with η > 0 , i = 1,...,n , t = 1,2 . (1)
We further assume that positive emission taxes τi in country i (and hence positive











 2 , with φ > 0 , i = 1,...,n , t = 1,2 . (2)
In period t global emissions, which are the sum of the emissions of all countries, accu-
mulate the stock of greenhouse gases, st, according to the following equation of motion:





t) , with γ > 0 , t = 1,2 , (3)
where γ denotes the constant and positive natural decay rate of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere.2 The initial stock of greenhouse gases is denoted by s0. Without loss of
generality we assume that s0 = 0. This simpliﬁes further calculations without impacting
qualitatively on our results.
The global stock of greenhouse gases in period t, st, gives rise to strictly increasing and
strictly convex damage for each country i:





t , with β > 0 , t = 1,2 . (4)
Finally, countries are assumed to discount outcomes in period t = 2 with the discount
factor δ < 1.
1This is a standard short cut to capture aggregate abatement costs in country i (see, e.g., Falk and
Mendelsohn 1993).
2Note that emissions accumulate the stock of greenhouse gases instantaneously. This is a useful
assumption in allowing for a two-period model.
33 Social Optimum and Decentralization
Before we introduce the global refunding scheme (GRS) in the next section, we charac-
terize the global social optimum and the decentralized solution when no international
agreement has been reached. As is well known, the latter is ineﬃcient because the emis-
sions of each individual country induce negative externalities on all other countries that
an individual country does not take into account when choosing its emission tax.
Both the global social optimum and the decentralized outcome are important bench-
marks for any potential international agreement. Obviously, any agreement has to
outperform the decentralized outcome in order to be seriously considered. Moreover,
an agreement is “better”, the closer its outcome is to the global social optimum.
3.1 Global Social Optimum
Consider a global social planner seeking to maximize global welfare, i.e., seeking to
minimize the net present value of the global costs of emission abatement and the sum
of national damages stemming from greenhouse gas emissions. The social planner’s



























subject to equations (3), (1), and τi
t ≥ 0, i = 1,...,n, t = 1,2 .






































t denotes the Langrange multiplier or shadow price for the global stock of

















t = 0 , t = 1,2 , (7b)
where λGO
3 = 0. Due to the strict convexity of the Lagrangian these necessary conditions









k−tsk , t = 1,2 . (8)
Note that λGO
t equals the net present value of all global future damages stemming from
a marginal unit of emissions in period t. This makes the interpretation of equation
(7a) straightforward. In the optimum, the costs incurred by a marginal increase of the
emission tax τi
t equal the net present value of all future global damages prevented by
the abatement of emissions via the marginal increase of the emission tax.
Inserting equation (8) into equation (7a) yields the 2n necessary and suﬃcient condi-
tions for the 2n emission taxes τi







k−t sk , i = 1,...,n, t = 1,2 . (9)
For given t, the right hand side of equation (9) is identical for all i = 1,...,n. As a
consequence, all countries set the same emission taxes τt in the global social optimum.
These are given by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Global social optimum)
Given the optimization problem (5) subject to equation (3), equation (1), and τi
t ≥
0 (i = 1,...n, t = 1,2), the optimal emission taxes τ⋆







1 + δ(1 − γ)(2 − γ)
 
+ n2η2β





φ(2 − γ) + n2η2β
(φ + n2η2β)2 + φn2η2βδ(1 − γ)2 . (10b)





1 = nφ¯ e
φ + n2η2β
 
1 − δ(1 − γ)
 
(φ + n2η2β)2 + φn2η2βδ(1 − γ)2 , (11a)
s
⋆
2 = nφ¯ e
φ(2 − γ) + n2η2β
(φ + n2η2β)2 + φn2η2βδ(1 − γ)2 . (11b)
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the appendix.
3.2 Decentralized Solution
Next we examine a decentralized system where a local planner in each country (e.g. a
government) seeks to minimize local costs and damages. We look for subgame perfect
5Nash equilibria when each country chooses its own sequence of emission taxes. Thus























subject to equations (3), (1), and τi
t ≥ 0, t = 1,2 .
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(¯ e − ητ
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t denotes the Lagrange multiplier or shadow price of the stock of greenhouse

















t = 0, t = 1,2 , (14b)
with λDS
3 = 0. Analogously to Section 3.1, these necessary conditions are also suﬃcient
for a unique solution due to the strict convexity of the Lagrangian. By backward









k−tsk , t = 1,2 . (15)
Inserting equation (15) into equation (14a) yields the 2 necessary and suﬃcient con-
ditions for the emission taxes τi
t for a local optimum of country i, given the emission
taxes τ
j







k−t sk , t = 1,2 . (16)
The set of the necessary and suﬃcient conditions (16) for all countries i, i.e., the set of
emission taxes chosen by all countries in both periods, determines the subgame perfect
equilibrium. Again, the right hand side is identical for all countries i and the conditions
are linear. As a consequence, all countries set the same equilibrium emission taxes ˆ τt
in t = 2 and, by working backwards, also in t = 1, as the following proposition states:
6Proposition 2 (Decentralized solution)
The dynamic game in which each country optimizes (12) subject to equation (3), equa-
tion (1), τi
t ≥ 0 (t = 1,2), and given the behavior of all other countries, has a unique
symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium, which is given by the following equilibrium
emission taxes ˆ τt:
ˆ τ1 = nηβ¯ e
φ
 
1 + δ(1 − γ)(2 − γ)
 
+ nη2β
(φ + nη2β)2 + φnη2βδ(1 − γ)2 , (17a)
ˆ τ2 = nηβ¯ e
φ(2 − γ) + nη2β
(φ + nη2β)2 + φnη2βδ(1 − γ)2 . (17b)
This yields the following equilibrium stocks ˆ s1 and ˆ s2:
ˆ s1 = nφ¯ e
φ + nη2β
 
1 − δ(1 − γ)
 
(φ + nη2β)2 + φnη2βδ(1 − γ)2 , (18a)
ˆ s2 = nφ¯ e
φ(2 − γ) + nη2β
(φ + nη2β)2 + φnη2βδ(1 − γ)2 . (18b)
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the appendix.
From equation (15) we see that in the decentralized outcome the shadow price for
the stock of greenhouse gases, λDS
t , only accounts for local damages. In fact, abating
emissions in country i induces a positive externality for all other countries j  = i both
now and in the future, as it reduces the global stock of greenhouse gases and hence the
damages in all countries. In the subgame perfect equilibrium, these positive externalities
are not taken into account. As a consequence, the shadow prices in the decentralized
solution are lower than in the global social optimum. Accordingly, the optimal level of
abatement (or emission tax) is higher and the optimal stocks of greenhouse gases are
lower in the global social optimum.3
4 Global Refunding Scheme
We now design a global refunding scheme (GRS). Members are free to choose national
emission taxes τi
t but agree to pay an initial fee fi
0 into a global fund. In addition, the
emission tax revenues of all countries in all periods are also collected in this fund. In
3This result is well known from public economics. The public good “emission reductions” is pro-
vided to a suboptimal degree because the producer (country i) is not suﬃciently compensated by the
consumers (countries i  = j) of the public good.
7? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?




CA announces α1, Θ1
countries set τi
1
members transfer tax revenues
CA refunds α1f1
and invests (1−α1)f1
countries may leave GRS
CA announces α2, Θ2
countries set τi
2
members transfer tax revenues
CA refunds α2f2
CA dissolved and re-
maining funds distributed
Figure 1: An illustration of the timing of the global refunding scheme.
each period t, a fraction (1 − αt) of the fund’s assets is invested and earns interest ρ
per period. The remaining fraction αt is reimbursed to the participating countries in
proportion to the emission reductions they have achieved in this period.
In the following, we analyze the capacity of such a GRS to solve the free-riding in-
centives in the provision of the global public good of mitigating climate change. First
we explain the rules and the timing of payments and refunds in detail and derive the
optimal tax levels for member countries of the GRS. Second, given that all countries
signing the treaty remain in the GRS over its whole lifetime, we show that the GRS can
internalize the externalities induced within the member countries. Third, we show that
the GRS is self-enforcing in the sense that all countries that have signed the agreement
in the ﬁrst period will also comply with the GRS in the second period. Thus, given
that all countries join the GRS, the globally optimal level of emission abatement can
be achieved.
4.1 Rules and timing of the GRS
The timing of the GRS is illustrated in Figure 1. At the beginning of period t = 1
countries decide whether to sign the GRS or not. Signing the agreement requires the
payment of an initial fee fi
0, which is transferred to a global fund f1. Participating
countries set up a central agency (CA) that handles the global refunding scheme. The
CA has the right to set the fractions α1 and α2 of the funds reimbursed to the member
8countries in periods t = 1 and t = 2, and the maximum levels of emissions Θ1 and Θ2,
which have to be undercut by member countries to be eligible for refunds. We assume
that the CA acts in the interests of member countries.4 That is, the CA seeks to set the
GRS parameters fi
0, αt, and Θt to induce member countries to choose emission taxes
internalizing the externalities imposed on other member countries. In formal terms,
given the emission taxes of all non-participating countries, the CA seeks to achieve





























subject to equations (3), (1), and τi
t ≥ 0, i ∈ GRS, t = 1,2 .
The notation i ∈ GRS (i / ∈ GRS) describes the membership status of country i
regarding the GRS. Assuming that m1 ≤ n countries join the GRS in period t = 1 and
m2 ≤ m1 countries stay in the GRS in period t = 2, the emission taxes among member
countries that the CA seeks to implement are given by the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Tax goal for GRS members)
Suppose that m1 countries (i = 1,...,m1) join the GRS in period t = 1 and m2 ≤ m1
countries (i = 1,...,m2) stay in the GRS in period t = 2. Then, given emission taxes
imposed by the non-participating countries τ
j
t (j = mt + 1,...,n), the CA seeks to
implement the solution of the optimization problem (19) subject to equations (3), (1),
and τi
t ≥ 0 (i ∈ GRS, t = 1,2). Thus the CA’s tax goal τTG
1 , τTG





n¯ e{φ[m1 + m2δ(1 − γ)(2 − γ)] + m1m2
2η2β}
φ2 + φη2β [m2
1 + m2




ηT1 {φ[m1 + m2δ(1 − γ)2] + m1m2
2η2β} + ηT2φm2δ(1 − γ)
φ2 + φη2β [m2
1 + m2













n¯ e[φ(2 − γ) + m2
1η2β] − ηT1φ(1 − γ) − ηT2(φ + m2
1η2β)
φ2 + φη2β [m2
1 + m2
2 + m1m2δ(1 − γ)2] + m2
1m2
2η4β2 , (20c)
where Tt denotes the sum of the taxes imposed by all non-participating countries in
4We neglect the agency problems that might arise when member countries delegate the power to
















n¯ e{φ + m2η2β [m2 − m1δ(1 − γ)]} − ηT1(φ + m2
2η2β)
φ2 + φη2β [m2
1 + m2
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n¯ e[φ(2 − γ) + m2
1η2β] − ηT1φ(1 − γ) − ηT2(φ + m2
1η2β)
φ2 + φη2β [m2
1 + m2
2 + m1m2δ(1 − γ)2] + m2
1m2
2η4β2 . (22c)
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the appendix.
Corollary 1
If all n countries join the GRS in period t = 1 and remain in the GRS in period
t = 2 (i.e., m1 = m2 = n in Proposition 3), Tt = 0 and the CA’s taxgoal τTG
t and the
corresponding stocks sTG
t equal the taxes τ⋆
t and stocks s⋆
t of the global social optimum
as deﬁned in equations (10) and (11).
Corollary 1 follows from Proposition 3 by calculating τTG
t and sTG
t for m1 = m2 = n.
Given the parameter settings by the CA, countries choose national emission taxes,
and participating countries transfer national emission tax revenues to the global fund
f1. At the end of period t = 1, the CA reimburses fraction α1 of the fund f1 to
member countries. Each member country receives a share in proportion to the relative
greenhouse gas reductions compared to the emission level Θ1. The remaining fund earns
interest ρ and is transferred to the next period’s fund f2.
At the beginning of period t = 2, member countries decide whether to leave the GRS.
If they do, they lose all claims on payments from the global fund. The CA announces
refunding share α2 and emission level Θ2. In general, these settings depend on the
number of countries still in the GRS. Again, all countries set national emission tax
levels, and member countries transfer emission tax revenues to the global fund. At the
end of period t = 2, the CA refunds share α2 to the member countries according to the
refunding rule. If α2 < 1, the remaining fund (1 − α2)f2 is distributed equally among
the member countries by lump-sum transfer.
10For the refund ri
















, t = 1,2 . (23)
The refunding formula captures the basic idea of a GRS: the refund a country i receives
is proportional to the relative emission reductions it achieves. The assets of the fund



















2(¯ e − ητ
i
2) . (24b)




− 1 . (25)
In the following, we investigate the incentives for reducing greenhouse gas emissions
created by the GRS in two steps. First we assume that m1 countries join the GRS in
period t = 1 and all m1 countries decide to stay in the GRS in period t = 2. We show
that under these assumptions the GRS can always implement the favored tax goal as
described by Proposition 3. Second, we investigate the conditions under which the GRS
is self-enforcing, i.e., provided that m1 countries joined the GRS in period t = 1, no
country has an incentive to leave the GRS in period t = 2. Again, we show that the
CA can set the GRS parameters in such a way that no country will leave the GRS in
period t = 2.
4.2 Full Participation Outcome
We assume in this section that m1 countries join the GRS in period t = 1 and all m1
countries decide to stay in the GRS in period t = 2 (i.e., m2 = m1). We will call this
the full participation assumption. Given this assumption, we derive the necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for all participating countries to choose the emission taxes τTG
1 ,
τTG
2 as deﬁned in Proposition 3. In addition, we show that there are initial payments
fi
0, refunding shares α1 and α2, and emission levels Θ1 and Θ2 ensuring that the tax
goal is achieved. For more convenient presentation, we ﬁrst assume that the refunding
11share ri
t > 0 for all countries i participating in the GRS. We will see ex post that this
assumption is veriﬁed in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, assuming that
m1 countries i participate in the global refunding system, each country i solves the
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subject to equations (3), (1), (24), and τi
t ≥ 0, t = 1,2 .
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t denote the Lagrange multipliers or shadow prices of the stock of greenhouse
gases st, and the fund ft is given by equations (24).
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Θ2 − ¯ e + ητ
j
2
  2 = 0 , (28b)
∂L
∂s1




1 = 0 , (28c)
∂L
∂s2
= δβs2 − λ
GRS
2 = 0 . (28d)
If the Lagrangian is strictly convex (at least along the optimal path), these necessary
conditions, together with the conditions τi
t ≥ 0 (t = 1,2), are also suﬃcient for a unique
12solution. However, strict convexity of the Lagrangian (27) is not generally guaranteed
and may hinge upon the CA’s choice of GRS parameters fi
0, αt, and Θt. The follow-
ing proposition establishes a suﬃcient condition enabling the CA to ensure the strict
convexity of the Lagrangian.
Proposition 4 (Suﬃcient condition for strict convexity)
Given the maximization problem (26) subject to equations (3), (1), (24), and τi
t ≥ 0
(t = 1,2), the CA can always set fi
0 such that the resulting Lagrangian (27) is strictly
convex, if the following condition holds:
φ ≥ 2η . (29)
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the appendix.
For the remainder of the paper, we assume that condition (29) holds.
We next calculate the equilibrium tax rates. From the necessary conditions (28c) and




1 = β [s1 + δ(1 − γ)s2] , λ
GRS
2 = δβs2 . (30)
As all m1 countries are identical, we focus on symmetric Nash equilibria. Thus, all
countries i ∈ GRS set the same emission taxes, i.e., τi
t = τt ∀i ∈ GRS. Then insert-
ing equations (30) into conditions (28a) and (28b) yields the following two necessary
conditions for country i:
φτ1 = ηβ [s1 + δ(1 − γ)s2] +
(m1 − 1)ηα1f1
m2
1 (Θ1 − ¯ e + ητ1)




φτ2 = ηβs2 +
(m1 − 1)ηα2f2
m2
1 (Θ2 − ¯ e + ητ2)




By inserting st and ft from equations (3) and (24), we derive a system of two quadratic
equations in τ1 and τ2, which yields up to four real solutions for the vector (τ1,τ2). If,
however, condition (29) holds and fi
0 is suﬃciently high for the Lagrangian to be strictly
convex, then the solution is unique (i.e., there is only one real solution with τt ≥ 0,
t = 1,2). Hence, given the GRS parameters fi
0, αt, and Θt announced by the CA, there
exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where all countries choose emission taxes
τ1 and τ2 determined by the non-negative solutions of the system of equations (31).
We now turn to the question of how the CA must set the GRS parameters fi
0, αt, and
Θt in order to achieve the tax goal derived in Proposition 3. For any tax goal τ1 and
13τ2 the CA seeks to implement, the CA has to set the GRS parameters fi
0, αt, Θt such
that equations (31) hold. Obviously, (31) is an overdetermined system of equations,
as we have only two equations for the ﬁve unknown GRS paremeters f0
i , αt, and Θt.
This implies that the CA has some degree of freedom about how to implement the tax
goal. This degree of freedom is important in two ways. First, it guarantees that the CA
can set the policy parameters so that the individual country’s optimization problem
is strictly convex (see Proposition 4). Second, in the next subsection we consider the
conditions under which no country has an incentive to leave the agreement at the
beginning of period t = 2. We will see that this implies further restrictions on the GRS
parameters.5 In the following proposition we show that, for any given fi
0, the CA can
choose Θt and αt such that the tax goal is a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in
the dynamic game in which all countries minimize their own costs and damages, given
that m1 countries participate in the GRS in both periods and given the choices of the
CA and all other countries.
Proposition 5 (Feasibility of the tax goal under full participation)
Suppose that m1 countries participate in the GRS in both periods and that condition
(29) holds. Then, for any given values of fi
0, the CA can ﬁnd feasible parameter values
for αt and Θt (t = 1,2) such that the tax goal as given by equations (20) and (22) is
supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 5 is given in the appendix.
The following corollary derives directly from combining the results of Propositions 4
and 5.
Corollary 2
Given the assumptions of Proposition 5, the CA can ﬁnd parameter values fi
0, αt and
Θt such that the tax goal as given by equations (20) and (22) is the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium.
The proof of Corollary 2 is given in the appendix.
Thus, under the assumption that m1 countries participate in the GRS in both periods,
the CA can set the GRS parameters fi
0, αt, and Θt such that all countries choose
emission taxes equivalent to the tax goal of the CA. In the next subsection we relax the
assumption that all countries will stay in the GRS in the second period per deﬁnitionem
5In fact, both convexity and self-enforcement imply minimum levels of the initial fee fi
0.
14and investigate the conditions under which countries voluntarily choose to remain in
the GRS.
4.3 Self-enforcement of the GRS
Now we turn to the conditions under which the GRS is self-enforcing, i.e., given that
m1 countries joined the GRS in period t = 1, no country has an incentive to leave the
GRS at the beginning of period t = 2.
To discuss this participation constraint at the beginning of period 2, we examine the
consequence of n−m2 countries i = m2+1,...,n not taking part in the GRS in period
t = 2, where m2 ≤ m1 and m1 −m2 is the number of countries leaving the GRS at the
beginning of period t = 2. Suppose that each country i = m2 + 1,...,n that does not
participate in the GRS in period t = 2 only minimizes their own costs and damages.6



















subject to equations (3), (1), and τi
2 ≥ 0 ,i / ∈ GRS.
According to equation (3) the stock s2 of greenhouse gases depends on the stock s1 of
the former period, the emissions of countries i = m2+1,...,n, and the emissions of all
other countries j  = i. The countries j = 1,...,m2 are assumed to remain in the GRS,
and the CA will set α2 and Θ2 in their interests. That is, the CA’s tax goal is the tax
τTG
2 that minimizes the costs and damages of all member countries of the GRS, given
the emission taxes of all non-participating countries. Suppose that m1 countries joined
the GRS in period t = 1 and the implemented tax goal in the ﬁrst period equaled tax
τTG
1 as given by equation (20a). Then the CA’s tax goal in period t = 2, according to























2 is the sum of the emission taxes of the countries not partici-
pating in the GRS in period t = 2.
6We neglect the eventuality of m1 − m2 countries forming a separate GRS for the last period.
15Analogously to the previous subsection, the following proposition establishes that the
CA can implement the taxgoal as deﬁned in equations (33) by the appropriate choice
of GRS parameters Θ2 and α2 as the unique Nash equilibrium of the game in period
t = 2, in which all countries i (i = 1,...,m2), given τ
j
2 (j = m2 + 1,...,n), α2, and
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subject to equations (3), (1), (24), and τi
2 ≥ 0 ,i ∈ GRS.
Proposition 6 (Feasibility of the tax goal in period t = 2)
Suppose that m2 countries participate in the GRS in period t = 2 and that condition
(29) holds. Then the CA can ﬁnd parameter values for α2 and Θ2 for any given values
of fi
0 such that the tax goal as given by equations (33a) and (33b) is supported as a Nash
equilibrium. If, in addition, the minimization problems of all countries i are convex,
the tax goal is the unique Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 6 is given in the appendix.
Given that the CA implements the optimal tax goal τTG
2 for member countries of
the GRS, the emission taxes for the member countries and the emission taxes for the
countries j = m2 + 1,...,n not participating in the GRS in period t = 2 is given by
the following proposition:
Proposition 7 (Nash equilibrium in period t = 2)
Suppose that m1 countries join the GRS in period t = 1, m2 countries stay in the GRS
in period t = 2, and the CA successfully implements the optimal tax goal for member
countries of the GRS in both periods. Then the emission taxes τ￿￿ ￿ GRS
2 of the countries
not participating in the GRS and the emission taxes τGRS
2 of the countries staying in
the GRS are given by
τ￿￿ ￿ GRS
2 (m2) = ηβ
(1 − γ)sTG
1 + n¯ e





2 (m2) = m2ηβ
(1 − γ)sTG
1 + n¯ e
φ + η2β [(m1 − m2) + m2
2]
. (35b)
16For the stock s2(m2) of greenhouse gases this implies
s2(m2) = φ
(1 − γ)sTG
1 + n¯ e
φ + η2β [(m1 − m2) + m2
2]
. (36)
The proof of Proposition 7 is given in the appendix.
Having established the outcome in period t = 2 if m1 −m2 countries leave the GRS in
period t = 2, we can now turn to the question of what condition makes it beneﬁcial for
a country i to leave the GRS. Assuming that all countries act in their own interests, a
country i will leaves the GRS in period t = 2 if the costs C￿￿ ￿ GRS(m2 − 1) of leaving the
GRS, given by











 2 , (37)



























Denoting the cost diﬀerence between staying in the GRS and leaving the GRS, given
that m2 countries stay in the GRS, by ∆C(m2)
∆C(m2) = C
GRS(m2) − C￿￿ ￿ GRS(m2 − 1) , (39)
country i will leave the GRS if ∆C(m2) ≥ 0.
In the following proposition we show that the GRS is self-enforcing in the sense that
for all m2 = 1,...,n the CA can set fi
0 such that ∆C(m2) < 0 and so no country has
an incentive to leave the GRS in period t = 2.
Proposition 8 (Self-enforcement of the GRS)
Suppose that m2 countries are members of the GRS at the beginning of period t = 2,
a member country i will leave the GRS in period t = 2 if ∆C(m2) ≥ 0, and countries
leaving the GRS minimize (32) subject to equations (3), (1), (33), and τ
j
2 ≥ 0 (j / ∈
GRS). Then the CA can set the initial fee fi
0 such that no country will leave the GRS
in period t = 2.
The proof of Proposition 8 is given in the appendix.
Proposition 8 says that the CA can always set fi
0 so that there is no incentive for any
country to leave the GRS, which implies that all countries will remain in the GRS.
Accordingly, the GRS is self-enforcing.
17In summary, we have shown that for any number of countries m1 joining the GRS in
period t = 1 a self-enforcing GRS can be designed such that the tax goal as given by
Proposition 3 is achieved for both periods. If all countries join the GRS in period t = 1
(i.e., m1 = n), then the GRS achieves the global social optimum.
5 Discussion
We have designed a global refunding scheme inducing countries to follow a socially
optimal path of abatement. Within the formal representation of our model we have
shown that, once all countries have joined, the GRS can achieve the global social
optimum. Moreover, it is self-enforcing in the sense that no country has an incentive
to leave the GRS. However, our formal results rest on a number of strong assumptions,
some of which we will discuss in the following. We also indicate some important avenues
for further research.
First we discuss particular institutional details of the global refunding system proposed
in this paper. We have assumed that the GRS is operated by a central agency acting
in the interests of member countries. An equivalent institution would be a body gov-
erning the GRS in which each member country has one delegate with one vote and
decisions are taken by simple majority rule. As member countries are homogeneous
and their interests are thus aligned, majority decisions would yield the same outcomes
as delegation to a central authority.
Next, the system relies on the determination of the path of emission levels Θ1 and Θ2 by
the central authority. Alternative refunding formulas are conceivable that do not rely on
additional information beyond the emission reductions actually realized. For instance,
a country’s refund might depend solely on the proportion of emission reductions it
achieves within a given period compared to previous periods. In principle, such a scheme
can generate similarly powerful abatement incentives and also yields a self-enforcing
property for the GRS. However, the analytical complexity increases substantially as a
further intertemporal incentive eﬀect occurs because strong abatement in a particular
period increases refund costs in subsequent periods.
Second, participation in the GRS in period t = 1 is a delicate issue as the scheme
requires initial monetary commitment by all countries. As in the literature on public
goods, this can be justiﬁed by cancelling the initial agreement if one country does not
18sign the commitment. That is, the GRS will not be established unless all countries par-
ticipate.7 A next step would be to examine sequential procedures for inducing countries
to participate.8 The crucial issue is whether the strong incentives to abate generated
by the system developed in this paper can be built up over time.
Third, in our model we assume completely symmetric countries. In fact, countries
diﬀer both in the costs of emission abatement and in the expected damages from
climate change. Most studies indicate that the economic and social impacts of climate
change would be distributed very unevenly across the globe. In particular, there is a
prospect of large damages to developing countries in the tropics (see, e.g., Tol 2006).
Such countries will not only have higher marginal damages, they also may lack the
funds to participate in the GRS. Whether it is possible to design an eﬃcient GRS
where all countries participate but only a subset of countries (i.e. “rich” countries) pay
an initial fee and are eligible to receive non-refunded funds at the end of the life-time, is
an important avenue for further research on narrowing the gap between the theoretical
concept and its practical applications.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced an alternative international climate change mitigation
agreement, the global refunding scheme (GRS), which is a potential candidate for re-
placing or succeeding existing agreements such as the Kyoto protocol. The basic idea of
the GRS is that each country is free to set its carbon emission tax but all tax revenues
of member countries are collected in a global fund and partly reimbursed to member
countries in proportion to the relative emission reductions they have achieved within
a given period and compared to some given emission levels.
Within a simple model framework we have shown that the GRS can completely over-
come the the free-riding problem involved in the provision of the global public good
“mitigation of climate change” and thus implement globally social optimal levels of
emission abatement. Moreover, the GRS is self-enforcing in the sense that compliance
with the agreement is in the interests of all member countries and therefore does not
rely on a supranational body with the power to prosecute infringement of the agree-
7It can easily be seen from Propositions 1 and 2 that joining the GRS is more proﬁtable for an
individual country than the fully decentralized solution.
8Such procedures have been proposed and examined in the literature on the private supply of public
goods (Andreoni 1998, Varian 1994, Lange 2006).
19ment.
However, participation by all countries in the GRS requires initial monetary payments
into the fund and the threat that the GRS will only materialize if all countries partic-
ipate. Sequential procedures might be able to overcome this problem. This issue and
accounting for heterogeneous countries are promising avenues for further research.
20Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Inserting equation (3) into equation (9) yields the following system of 2 linear and










1 + δ(1 − γ)
2 
+ τ2δ(1 − γ)} , (A.1a)
φτ2 = n
2ηβ¯ e(2 − γ) − n
2η
2β [τ1(1−γ) + τ2] , (A.1b)
the unique solution of which is given by equations (10).
Inserting τ⋆
1 and τ⋆
2 into the equation of motion for the greenhouse gas stock (3), we




Proof of Proposition 2
The set of subgame perfect equilibria is determined by the solution of the set of nec-
essary and suﬃcient linear conditions (16). In the subgame perfect equilibrium, all
countries i set the same emission taxes, as the right hand side of condition (16) is
identical across countries. Thus we can reduce (16) to a set of 2 linear equations for
the two unknowns ˆ τ1 and ˆ τ2 if we also insert the equation of motion (3) for the stocks
of greenhouse gases st and substitute emissions via equation (1):











φτ2 = nηβ¯ e(2−γ) − nη
2β [τ1(1−γ) + τ2] .
As these two equations are linear and independent, there exists a unique solution given
by equations (17).
We derive equations (18) for the stocks of greenhouse gases by inserting equations (17)
into the equation of motion (3).
2
Proof of Proposition 3
Let countries i = 1,...,m1 join the GRS in period t = 1, and let countries i =
211,...,m2 ≤ m1 stay in the GRS in period t = 2. Denote the sum of the emission taxes
imposed by non-participating countries in period t by Tt. Then the Lagrangian of the
optimization problem (19) subject to equations (3), (1), and τi







































t denotes the Langrange multiplier or shadow price for the global stock of

















t = 0 , t = 1,2 , (A.3b)
where λTG
3 = 0. Due to the strict convexity of the Lagrangian these necessary conditions









k−tsk , t = 1,2 . (A.4)
Inserting equations (A.4) and (3) into equation (A.3a) yields the m1+m2 necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for the m1 +m2 emission taxes τi
t. As all countries are symmetric,
all countries will exhibit the same optimal taxes τt, and the m1 + m2 necessary and
suﬃcient condition reduce to the following two linear and independent equations:
φτ1 = ηβ
 
n¯ e[m1 + m2δ(1 − γ)(2 − γ)] − ηT1
 
m1 + m2δ(1 − γ)
2 
−m2ηT2δ(1 − γ) − m1ητ1
 







φτ2 = m2ηβ [n¯ e(2 − γ) − ηT1(1 − γ) − ηT2 − m1ητ1(1−γ) − m2ητ2] . (A.5b)
The unique solution is given by equations (20).
We derive equations (22) for the stocks of greenhouse gases by inserting equations (20)
into the equation of motion (3).
2
22Proof of Proposition 4
The Lagrangian (27) is strictly convex if its Hessian is positive deﬁnite. A matrix
is positive deﬁnite if the determinants of all principal minors are strictly positive.
Diﬀerentiating the necessary conditions (28) with respect to τi
1, τi
2, s1 and s2 and
anticipating that we are only interested in symmetric equilibria so that τi
t = τt (∀ i =
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A21 A22 0 0
0 0 A33 0
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0 + Θ1(¯ e − Θ1)
 
, (A.7)
A12 = A21 = −
(m1 − 1)(1 − α1)α2η(¯ e − 2ητ1)
m2












1(Θ2 − ¯ e + ητ2)2
 






0 + τ1(¯ e − ητ1)
 
+ δΘ2(¯ e − Θ2)
 
, (A.9)
A33 = β , (A.10)
A44 = δβ . (A.11)
The principal minors Mk of H are given by deleting all but the ﬁrst k lines and rows
of H:












 , M4 = H .
A suﬃcient condition for det[M1] = A11 > 0 is that the following condition holds:
φ ≥ 2η , (A.12)
as all other terms in A11 are strictly positive, at least in equilibrium.9 Furthermore, we
see directly that det[M3] and det[M4] are strictly positive iﬀ det[M2] > 0:
det[M3] = A33 det[M2] , det[M4] = A33A44 det[M2] .
9Note that reasonable values for Θt are in the range [¯ e − ητt, ¯ e], otherwise there would be no
refunding and hence no additional incentive to abate.
23Deﬁning the following abbreviations
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0 + τ1(¯ e − ητ1)
 
+δΘ2(¯ e − Θ2)} , (A.15)
E =
(m1 − 1)2(1 − α1)2α2
2η2(¯ e − 2ητ1)2
m4
1(Θ2 − ¯ e + ητ2)2 , (A.16)
with B,C,D,E > 0 (if φ − 2η > 0 holds), we can write det[M2] as




2 + B(D + δC) + CD − E . (A.17)

















so for all values of φ, η, m1, ¯ e, Θ1, Θ2, α1, α2, τ1, and τ2 there exists a lower bound f
such that for all fi
0 > f, det[M2] > 0, and the Lagrangian (27) is strictly convex.
2
Proof of Proposition 5
According to Proposition 3 the CA’s tax goal if m1 countries participate in the GRS
in both periods is given by equations (20) setting m2 = m1. From equations (A.4) and









, t = 1,2 . (A.18)
Inserting τTG
1 , τTG
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1 (¯ e − ητTG
1 )] + τTG
2 (¯ e − τTG
2 )
  . (A.20b)
Obviously, α1 and α2 are non-negative for any reasonable choice of Θt ∈ [¯ e − ητ⋆
t ,¯ e]
(t = 1,2) if condition (29) holds. Moreover, for any set of exogenously given parameters,
any τ⋆
t and any given fi
0, there is an interval of feasible Θt ∈ [Θmin
t ,¯ e] such that
αt ∈ [0,1]. As a consequence, the CA can always ﬁnd suitable GRS parameters to ensure
that the tax goal τTG
1 and τTG
2 is supported as a Nash equilibrium of the individual
countries’ optimization problem.
2
Proof of Corollary 2:
Set fi
0 such that the Lagrangian (27) is strictly convex (Proposition 4). According
to Proposition 5 there exist feasible parameter values αt, Θt such that the global
social optimum is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Due to the strict convexity of the
Lagrangian for all countries i ∈ GRS the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique.
2
Proof of Proposition 6
The Lagrangian for the optimization problem (34), subject to equations (3), (1), (24)
and τi
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(1 − γ)s1 +
n  
j=1
(¯ e − ητ
j
t ) − s2
 
. (A.21)
Following the same line of argument as in Section 4.2, one derives the following neces-
sary condition for all countries i:
φτ2 = ηβs2 +
(m2 − 1)ηα2f2
m2
2 (Θ2 − ¯ e + ητ2)




25Again, the CA seeks policy parameters α2 and Θ2 such that equation (A.22) holds
when inserting the tax goal τTG
2 , as given by equation 33a. We know from equations
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1 (¯ e − ητTG
1 )] + m2τTG
2 (¯ e − τTG
2 )
  . (A.25)
Analogously to equation (A.20b) in the proof of Proposition 5, the CA can always ﬁnd
suitable GRS parameters ensuring that tax goal τTG
2 is supported as a Nash equilibrium
of the individual countries’ optimization problem.
2
Proof of Proposition 7
Given that m1 −m2 countries do not participate in the GRS in period t = 2 and min-
imize (32) subject to equations (3), (1), (33a), and τ
j

































This leads to the following necessary and (due to the strict convexity of the Lagrangian)


















Looking only for symmetric equilibria τ
j
2 = τ￿￿ ￿ GRS
2 and supposing that the CA can
implement tax goal τTG




1 + n¯ e − ηm2τGRS
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26the unique solution of which is given by equations (35). Inserting τ￿￿ ￿ GRS
2 and τGRS
2 into
the equation of motion for the stock of greenhouse gases (3) yields equation (36)
2
Proof of Proposition 8


































While the ﬁrst term is completely determined by exogenously given parameters and
may be positive (in fact, it can be shown to be positive for m2 ≥ 3), the second
term is always negative and a linear function of fi
0. Thus there exists an ˆ fi
0 such that
∆C(m2) < 0 for all m2 = 1,...,m1 if fi
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